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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Mr. Humphries filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, which
petition was dismissed by order of the district court on November
13, 1989.

This appeal is from that order.

The Court of Appeals

has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a3(2)(g) of the Utah Judicial Code (Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-2a3(2)(g) (Supp. 1989).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the appellant had a protected liberty interest

at stake in his parole eligibility hearing which would subject
the hearing to the procedural protections of due process?
2.

Whether the actions of the Board of Pardons during the

appellant's parole eligibility hearing violated the Board's
enabling statutes?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
U.S. CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation.
U.S. CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.

All persons born or naturalized in the United

1

States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, aro citizens uf
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTICLE L
Sec. 7. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
UTAH CODE ANN. 77-27-1
(r)|

"Expiration' orcurs when the maximum sentence has run

UTAH CODE ANN, U -Al -7
(2) Before reaching a final decision to release any
offender under this chapter, the board shall cause the offender
to appear before it or any appointed hearing officer, and shall
personally interview him to consider his fitness for release, and
verify as far as possible information furnished from other
sources. Any offender may waive a personal appearance before the
Board of Pardons. Any offender outside of the state shall, if
ordered by the Board of Pardons, submit to a courtesy hearing to
be held by the appropriate authority in the jurisdiction in which
the offender is housed in lieu of an appearance before the board.
Rules to carry out this section shall be made by the board. The
offender shall be promptly notified in writing of the board's
decision.
UTAH CODE ANN. 77-27-9
(1) The Board of Pardons may pardon or parole any offender
or commute or terminate the sentence of any offender committed to
a penal or correctional facility which is under the jurisdiction
of the Department of Corrections for a felony or class A
misdemeanor except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2). The
release of an offender shall be at the initiative of the board,
which shall consider each case as the offender becomes eligible.
However, a prisoner may submit his own application, subject to
the rules uf the board.
UTAH CODE ANN, ZlsA I ' "l
(3) The determinations and decisions of the Board of
Pardons in cases involving approval or denial of any actionr of
paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence,
orders of restitution, or remission of fines, forfeitures, and
restitution, are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in th i ti
2

section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil
judgment.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Mr. Humphries was convicted of issuing a bad check by the
Second Judicial District Court of Davis County.

After his parole

eligibility hearing before the Utah Board of Pardons on March 24,
1989, Mr. Humphries filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the Third Judicial District Court, challenging the Board's
actions in determining his parole date. Mr. Humphries claimed
that the Board inappropriately considered his prior criminal
record because the outcome of three of the twenty incidents
reported in the record had not been verified.

The outcomes were

reported in the record as per Mr. Humphries' interpretation, and
the record noted that these outcomes were not verified one way or
the other.
Pursuant to the State's motion, the district court dismissed
Mr. Humphries' petition by order dated November 13, 1989.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Humphries claims that the Board of Pardons' actions in
considering evidence which had not been fully verified violated
the due process provisions of the state and federal
constitutions, as well as the enabling statutes the Board
operates under.

However, due process guarantees were

inapplicable to Mr. Humphries' parole hearing since those
guarantees only apply to government actions which may deprive a
3

person of "liberty" or "property."

Both the federal and Utah

state courts have determined that a defendant who has been duly
convicted and sentenced to a term of incarceration has no
protected liberty interest in being released prior to the
expiration of his sentence, unless the state's parole statute
limits the discretion of the parole board such that an inmate is
legitimately entitled to parole upon meeting certain specified
conditions.

Because Utah's parole statute leaves the decision

whether to parole inmates almost entirely up to the discretion of
the Board of Pardons, the statute does not vest inmates with a
protected liberty interest in parole, and parole hearings are not
subject to the protections of due process.
Mr. Humphries' claim that the actions of the Board of
Pardons in considering his allegedly inaccurate criminal record
violated the Board's enabling statutes, is insubstantial because
he fails to specify any provision violated by such action.

In

fact, the actions which appellant complains of were in full
compliance with the standards and procedures established for the
Board in section 77-27-7(2) of the Utah Code of Criminal
Procedure.
In any case, Mr. Humphries suffered no harm from the Board's
consideration of this record, since he was allowed to, and did,
contest the accuracy of his criminal record before the Board.
Finally, Mr. Humphries' appeal must be dismissed because
Board of Pardons' decisions regarding parole are not subject to
judicial review.
4

ARGUMENT
Mr. Humphries' Petition claims that the Board of Pardons
deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty interest
without due process.

"Liberty interests protected by the

Fourteenth Amendment may arise from two sources—the Due Process
Clause itself and the laws of the States."
U.S. 460, 466 (1983).

Hewitt v. Helms, 459

The Board of Pardon's decision could not

have deprived the appellant of a constitutional right protected
by due process, because an inmate's desire in being paroled is
not a protected "liberty interest," under either the federal Due
Process Clause, Utah's due process provision, or Utah's Parole
Statute.

I. NO LIBERTY INTEREST IN PAROLE EXISTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.
In determining whether a protected interest arises under the
Due Process Clause, "[t]he question is . . . whether the nature
of the interest is one within the contemplation of the 'liberty
or property language of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (Citation Omitted).

In

answering this question, it is important to remember that
"[w]hile no State may 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law,' it is well settled that
only a limited range of interests fall within this provision."
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466 (Citation omitted).

In order to obtain a

protected liberty interest "a person clearly must have more than
an abstract need or desire for it.
5

He must have more than a

unilateral expectation of it.

He must, instead, have a

legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Board of Regents v. Roth/
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
The United States Supreme Court has determined that "there
is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to
be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid
sentence." Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).

The Court went on to

explain why a parole grant applicant has no constitutional
entitlement at stake in his parole hearing:
The natural desire of an individual to be released is
indistinguishable from the initial resistance to being
confined. But the conviction, with all its procedural
safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right:
"[G]iven a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has
been constitutionally deprived of his liberty."
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7, (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215, 224 (1976)).
The appellant does not deny receiving full due process
protection during the proceedings in which he was convicted and
sentenced.

In those proceedings, the plaintiff was

constitutionally deprived of his right to not be incarcerated
until the expiration of his sentence.

Under Utah's parole

statute, "'[e]xpiration' occurs when the maximum sentence has
run."

Utah Code Annotated, sec. 77-27-1(5) (1953 as amended).

The appellant had a hope of being paroled before the lawful
expiration of his sentence.
guarantee such a hope.

However, due process does not

"Process is not an end in itself.

Its

constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to
6

which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement."
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983).

The appellant had

no legitimate claim of entitlement to parole because he had been
constitutionally deprived of this right for the duration of his
sentence.

He only had a hope of parole, an expectation which is

not within the contemplation of the "liberty" language of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

II. NO LIBERTY INTEREST IN PAROLE EXISTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS
PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 1, SECTION 7.
While it is true that this Court could construe the Utah
Constitution to include the mere anticipation or hope of being
paroled within the contemplation of the "liberty" language of its
due process provision, the Court has not previously done so. To
the contrary, both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of
Appeals have expressly followed the rule set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Greenholtz, supra.

In Homer v. Morris,

684 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that
"[b]efore a parole date has been established, an inmate has no
constitutional right to be placed on parole."
66. (Citing Greenholtz).

Homer, 684 P.2d at

Recently, the Court of Appeals cited

Greenholtz for the rule that "'there is no constitutional or
inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released
before the expiration of a valid sentence.'
at 7, 99 S. Ct. at 2104."

Greenholtz, 442 U.S.

Hatch v. Deland, Case No. 890626-CA,

p. 3, Ct. Ap. Memorandum Decision filed March 19, 1990 (For
Publication).

It is clear that under Utah law, as well as United
7

States law, the appellant has no right to parole that is subject
to due process protections.

For the purposes of due process, a

protected interest in parole simply does not exist.

III. UTAH'S PAROLE STATUTE DOES NOT CREATE A LIBERTY INTEREST IN
BEING GRANTED PAROLE.
Even though no inherent liberty interest in parole exists by
virtue of either the Utah or United States Constitutions, such an
interest may be created by state law. When a state's parole
statute and regulatory provisions limit the discretion of the
parole board, mandating release of inmates once certain specified
conditions are met, courts may find a protected liberty interest
in being paroled.

When such a liberty interest is found, the

Supreme Court has determined that some degree of due process
applies, the measure of which depends on the nature and extent of
the interest found.

For example, in Greenholtzf supra, the Court

held that Nebraska's parole statute created an expectation of
release, which expectancy interest required that inmates have,
first, the right to be heard at their parole grant proceedings,
and second to be informed of the reasons if they are denied
parole.

However, the Court went on to hold that the Constitution

required no more than these two procedural safeguards.
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16.
When a state's parole statute lacks such mandatory language
and leaves the parole decision in the discretion of the Board of
Pardons, no protected liberty interest is created.
Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 379, nt. 10 (1987).
8

Board of

Appellant claims that Utah law does create a protected
liberty interest in an inmate's expectation of parole, which
would require Utah's Board of Pardons to heed certain procedural
safeguards during parole grant proceedings.

This assertion

contradicts the holdings of both the Tenth Circuit and Utah state
courts, which have determined that Utah's parole statute does not
give rise to a protected liberty interest. Most recently, this
rule was clearly set forth in Hatch v. Deland, Case No. 890626CA, Ct. Ap. Memorandum Decision filed March 19, 1990 (For
Publication).
[Ajbsent statutory language limiting a parole board's
discretion, H[t]here is no constitutional or inherent
right of a convicted person to be conditionally
released before the expiration of a valid sentence."
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7, 99 S. Ct. at 2104. . . .
Utah's parole statute contains no statutory limitations
on the Board's discretion to grant or deny parole.
Utah Code Ann. sec. 77-27-9(1) (Supp. 1989) provides,
in relevant part: "The Board of Pardons may pardon or
parole any offender or commute or terminate the
sentence of any offender committed to a penal or
correctional facility which is under the jurisdiction
of the Department of Corrections for a felony or a
class A misdemeanor . . . ." The statute precludes
parole for certain offenses until the minimum term for
the offense has been served. Under the controlling
precedents, we hold that the Utah parole statute does
not create an "expectation of parole" that would
subject parole board proceedings to due process
protections. See also. Dock v. Latimer, 729 F.2d 1287,
1290 (10th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 885
(1984) (concluding that the previous Utah parole
statute did not create a liberty interest subject to
due process protections).
Hatch v. Deland, Case No. 890626-CA, Ct. Ap. Memorandum Decision
filed March 19, 1990, at 3 (For Publication).

This holding is in

accordance with the Utah Supreme Court's construction of Utah's
9

Parole Statute in

State v. Schreuder, 712 P. 2d 264, 277 (Utah

1985), holding that Utah's "sentencing system vests almost
complete discretion in the Board of Pardons to determine the
period of time that will actually be served."

Since Utah's

parole statute does not give inmates a protected liberty interest
in parole, appellant's parole hearing was not subject to due
process guarantees and his claim that he was denied due process
is unfounded.

IV.

NO DUE PROCESS VIOLATION OCCURRED IN ANY EVENT.
The appellant's claim in this case is that the Board of

Pardons improperly relied upon prior erroneous convictions in
setting his parole date.

This argument is meritless.

The

appellant was allowed at the hearing to challenge whatever
portions of his criminal record he felt were inaccurate.
appellant has been allowed to do this all along.

The

Even in the

preparation of the appellant's presentence investigation report
(Appendix A ) , the petitioner was allowed to dispute his record
and have that dispute noted.

The investigator expressly stated

in the report:
NOTE: The defendant had a copy of his NCIC
records, and during the interview with this agent, he
went through each case and shared his opinion of the
disposition of these cases. Whenever there has been a
question as to the disposition, this agent has placed
in parenthesis the results of that particular case as
per the defendant's interpretation. This agent has not
been able to substantiate by a third party the
information in parenthesis.
In effect the appellant disputed the entries in his criminal
10

record to the Board of Pardons.

Because of this no prejudice to

Mr. Humphries resulted.

V. THE ACTIONS OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS WERE IN COMPLETE
COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH LAW.
Appellant claims that the actions of the Board of Pardons in
considering his less-than-completely-verified criminal record
violated the enabling statutes of the Board.

The transparency of

this claim is demonstrated by the fact that the appellant could
not specify any particular statutory provision that was violated.
He only makes the general allegation that the Board has violated
Utah law, and cites Andrews v. Haun, 779 P.2d 229 (1989) for the
proposition that the Board must abide by the statutes which
created it.

Respondents do not contest the Andrews proposition,

but they fail to see in what manner the Board has violated Utah
statutes.

In fact, the actions of the Board were expressly in

accordance with the Board's enabling statutes, which provide:
Before reaching a final decision to release any
offender under this chapter, the board shall cause the
offender to appear before it or any appointed hearing
officer, and shall personally interview him to consider
his fitness for release, and verify as far as possible
information furnished from other sources. . . .
Utah Code Annotated, section 77-27-7(2) (1953, as
amended)(Emphasis added).

Utah's parole statute does not require

that the evidence it considers meet admissibility standards
applicable to the courts.

The statute expressly requires that

the board verify "as far as possible" the information it receives
from sources other than the parole applicant.
11

The Board did

this.

The agent submitting the appellant's criminal record to

the Board verified it as far as possible, and he carefully noted
those entries which he was unable to substantiate.

Since this is

all that the statute requires, appellant's allegation that the
Board somehow violated its enabling statutes by considering his
partially unverified criminal record is simply not true. The
Board's actions were in full compliance with Utah's parole
statutes.

VI. MR. HUMPHRIES APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE BOARD OF
PARDONS' DECISIONS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW.
When a person has been sentenced to a term at the Utah State
Prison, the Utah Board of Pardons is the entity which determines
the exact length of time the person serves.
Utah Code Ann. 77-27-5(3) (1953 as amended) states:
The determinations and decisions of the Board of
Pardons in cases involving approval or denial of any
action, of paroles, pardons, commutations or
terminations of sentence, orders of restitution, or
remission of fines, forfeitures, and restitution, are
not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this
section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a
c ivi1 j udgment.
See State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985).
Mr. Humphries challenges the decision of the Board of
Pardons in setting a particular a parole date. Mr. Humphries
apparently believes he should have been given an earlier date.
The challenge, obviously, is a request to the Court to review a
parole decision made by the Utah Board of Pardons.

Under U.C.A.

§77-27-5(3) such a decision is not subject to judicial review.
12

Thus, Mr. Humphries' challenge must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's claim of a denial of due process must fail,
since, absent a constitutional or statutorily created entitlement
to parole, due process was inapplicable to his parole grant
hearing.

Likewise, appellant's claim that the Board violated

Utah statutes is meritless.

Not only did the Board comply with

the standards and procedures established in U.C.A. section 77-277(2), the appellant has failed to specify any statutory provision
that the Board's actions did violate.

Having failed to show that

the Board of Pardons violated any constitutional or statutory
provision in determining his parole date, appellant's petition
was appropriately dismissed by the district court.

Finally, the

appellant's challenge to the Board of Pardons decision regarding
his parole is improper under U.C.A. §77-27-5(3).

Respondents

respectfully request this Court to affirm the District Court's
order.
DATED THIS 12TH DAY OF APRIL, 1990.

m e Noli
C/ Dane
Nolan
ssistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents
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PAGE 5
PRESENTENCE REPORT
TEOKAS ROBERT HUMPHRIES
Law Enforcement - Continued
bad checks. Further investigation indicated the defendant may have passed
as many as 20 additional checks. Detective 3arton was convinced the
defendant knew exactly what he was doing, and that this was not his first
attempt at passing bad checks. Detective Barton was adamant in his feelings
that the defendant should go to orison.

PRIOR RECORD:
A.
JUVENILE:
A check with the Utah Juvenile Court System
revealed no prior record; however, discussion with the defendant and copies
of TWX's and criminal records in possession of the defendant reveals the
following arrests:

DATE

PLACE

OFFENSE

DISPOSITION

5-20-71

Redford, Michigan

Stolen Property

Convicted

6-28-71

Livonia, Michigan

Dangerous Drugs

30 days jail

11-26-71

Redford, Michigan

Dangerous Drugs

Not guilty
(per defendant)

1-20-72

Clearwater, FL

Shoplifting

$157 fine
30 days jail

4-2-72

Ft* Lauderdale, FL

DDC (Drunk &
Disorderly Conduct)

$27 fine

5-8-72

Detroit, Michigan

Att. Carrying Concealed 5 yrs. probation
Weapon

check
with
the
Utah
Bureau
of
Criminal
ADULT:
B.
Identification, the Ogden City Police Department, Adult Probation and
Parole, and TWXfs sent to Michigan, California, and Florida revealed the
following adult offenses:
DATE

PLACE

OFFENSE

DISPOSITION

7-13-72

Livonia, MI

Dangerous Drugs

Not guilty
(per defendant)

7-1-74

Santa Cruz, CA

Drunk Driving
Resisting Arrest

12 mos. probation
$345 fine

7-19-74

San Francisco, CA

Poss. of Heroin

Dismissed

PA3E 6
PRESENTENCE REPORT
TEOMAS ROBERT HUMPHRIES
Prior Record - continued

DATE

PLACE

6-17-76

Henderson, NV

NOTE:

•"~M.c;;

DWI

DISPOSITION
Convicted

The defendant indicates the case is under acoeal.

5-7-79

Oregon City, OR

Carrying a Concealed
weaoon

Mot guilty
(per defendant)

11-9-81

Springfield, OR

DCS

Convicted

10-20-82

Oregon City, OR

XI/DOS

Convicted

12-21-82

Oregon City, OR

Assault

Dismissed

1-11-83

Springfield, OR

DOS

Convicted

3-14-83

Oregon City, OR

Assault
Criminal Mischief

Dismissed

4-8-85

Oregon City, OR

DUI/DOS
False Info, to P.O.

Unknown

6-18-87

San Jose, CA

Stolen Property
DUX

8 mos. jail
Santa Clara Co., CA

NOTE: Mr. Humphries has two warrants for his arrest out of the Santa Clara
County Sheriff's Office. They do not wish to extradite the defendant. He is
a walk-away from the Probation Department Community Service Program. He
served from June 18, 1987, until December 9, 1987, for a Possession of Stolen
Property and a DUI conviction. This information was provided by Deputy Marta
MoGrath, Santa Clara County Sheriff's Department on November 21, 1988 at 1606
hours*
4-15-88

Ogden, Utah

Assault

30 days jail

9-14-88

Farmington, Utah

Bad Checks

Current offense

NOTE: The defendant had a copy of his NCIC records, ar.d during the interview
with this agent, he went through each case and shared his opinion of the
disposition of these cases. Whenever there has been a question as to the
disposition, this agent- has placed in parenthesis the results of that
particular case as per the defendant's interpretation. This agent has nou.
been able to substantiate by a third party the information in parenthesis.

